Over ten years since its launch, the Belt and Road Initiative has grown from an ambitious infrastructure plan into a far-reaching tool of Chinese statecraft. More than 150 countries have signed on, drawn in by the promise of roads, railways, energy projects and development finance – but many are now rethinking the costs. Debt concerns, political blowback and limited local benefits have shifted the tone in capitals from Colombo to Buenos Aires.

While the BRI’s pace has slowed, its scope has widened. Traditional projects linking China to Europe and Africa by land and sea are now being joined by digital, nuclear and space-based corridors. The initiative continues to expand Beijing’s commercial reach, embed the yuan in cross-border finance and offer alternatives to Western development models – especially in Southeast Asia, Central Asia and East Africa.

At the same time, resistance is mounting. India has led the charge with its IMEC corridor, while Argentina and Sri Lanka have stepped back from deeper involvement. As the BRI enters a more selective and strategic phase, its impact on global trade, diplomacy and power dynamics is far from over.